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Abstract Amalgamating evidence from heterogeneous sources and across lev-
els of inquiry is becoming increasingly important in many pure and applied
sciences. This special issue provides a forum for researchers from diverse sci-
entific and philosophical perspectives to discuss evidence amalgamation, its
methodologies, its history, its pitfalls and its potential. We situate the contri-
butions therein within six themes from the broad literature on this subject: the
variety-of-evidence thesis, the philosophy of meta-analysis, the role of robust-
ness/sensitivity analysis for evidence amalgamation, its bearing on questions
of extrapolation and external validity of experiments, its connection with the-
ory development, and its interface with causal inference, especially regarding
causal theories of cancer.
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1 Introduction
The amalgamation of evidence from different models, scales, and types of data
continues to be central in diverse sciences such as biology, ecology, medicine,
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sociology, geography, climate science and economics. When access to phenom-
ena of interest is incomplete, piecemeal, indirect, or mediated by substantial
auxiliary assumptions, it is not always obvious in what manner scientists can
justifiably decide how their total evidence comparatively supports hypothe-
ses and informs future research. Policy makers, professional practitioners, and
others must act appropriately informed by such complex and heterogeneous
evidence. And philosophers of science try to understand the underlying logic
of these practices, their role in the history and development of the sciences,
and their avenues for refinement. Accordingly, the critical analysis of evidence
amalgamation in the sciences involves historical and descriptive aspects as well
as epistemically, methodologically, and ethically normative ones.
Here we have gathered thirteen contributions along each of these lines of
inquiry. With such diversity, it is of course difficult to amalgamate their collec-
tive morals into a simple conclusion! So, in this introduction, we introduce the
basic concepts and questions within the main themes of this special issue (in
section 2) before situating the contributions to the issue within these themes
and (in section 3) describing them in more detail. For readers interested in
specific themes, here is a list thereof with corresponding contributions:
1. The variety-of-evidence thesis (section 2.1): Claveau and Grenier (section
3.1) and Heesen et al (section 3.2).
2. The philosophy of meta-analysis (section 2.2): Holman (section 3.3), Vieland
and Chang (section 3.4), and Wu¨thrich and Steele (section 3.5).
3. The role of robustness/sensitivity analysis in amalgamating diverse evi-
dence (section 2.3): Wu¨thrich and Steele (section 3.5), Wilde and Parkki-
nen (section 3.6), and Kao (section 3.10).
4. How diverse types of evidence bear on the external validity of experimental
conclusions and extrapolation therefrom (section 2.4): Wilde and Parkki-
nen (section 3.6), Frank (section 3.7) and Reiss (section 3.8).
5. The role of amalgamating diverse evidence in theory development (section
2.5): Bertolaso and Sterpetti (section 3.9) and Kao (section 3.10).
6. Causal inference from diverse evidence (section 2.6): Wilde and Parkkinen
(section 3.6), Danks and Plis (section 3.11), Mayo-Wilson (section 3.12),
and Baetu (section 3.13).
Among these, Wilde and Parkkinen (section 3.6), Reiss (section 3.8) and Berto-
laso and Sterpetti (section 3.9) use the example of causal theories of cancer to
illustrate their arguments, hence are of interest to readers topically interested
in how those theories meet general issues in amalgamating evidence.
Finally, in section 4, we describe our outlook on these themes, including
future directions for research, in light of these contributions.
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2 Diverse Topics
2.1 Variety of Evidence
Varied evidence for a hypothesis confirms it more strongly than less varied ev-
idence, ceteris paribus. This epistemological Variety of Evidence Thesis enjoys
widespread and long-standing intuitive support among scientific methodol-
ogists (Carnap, 1962; Earman, 1992; Horwich, 1982; Hu¨ffmeier et al, 2016;
Keynes, 1921).
Nowadays, confirmation is almost always understood in terms of a Bayesian
confirmation measure. The starting point of contemporary Bayesian analy-
ses of this thesis (Claveau, 2013; Landes, 2018; Landes and Osimani, 2019;
Stegenga and Menon, 2017) is the analysis of Bovens and Hartmann (2002,
2003)—the recent Kuorikoski and Marchionni (2016) is an interesting excep-
tion to this rule.
Bovens and Hartmann study the Bayesian confirmation a body of evidence,
E , bestows on a (scientific) hypothesis of interest, H. Their model of scientific
inference is represented by a Bayesian network over the following binary vari-
ables: a hypothesis variable H, a set of variables C which represent the testable
consequences of the hypothesis H, evidence variables E, each of which pertain
to precisely one consequence variable, and a set of variables R which stand for
the reliability of the instruments employed to obtain the evidence. To com-
pare two different bodies of evidence ED and EN in terms of their confirmatory
value, they compare the difference in posterior beliefs in the hypothesis H, i.e.,
they compare P (H|ED) to P (H|EN ).
They compare the confirmation of an hypothesis H by a diverse body of
evidence (depicted in the right-hand column of Figure 1), ED, to that by a
narrow body of evidence (depicted in the left-hand column of Figure 1), EN ,
in three different scenarios. Plausibly, one may take the Variety of Evidence
Thesis to entail in all three scenarios that
P (H|ED) > P (H|EN ) .
Their key contribution is to show that instead
P (H|ED) < P (H|EN )
in all three scenarios for some sensible prior probability distributions.
Claveau and Grenier (2018) extend the Bovens and Hartmann model by
formalizing the notion of unreliability in a way which is closer to scientific prac-
tice. Furthermore, they consider consequence variables and reliability variables
that are dependent to a degree, showing that the VET fails in many of their
models. Heesen et al (2018) break with the tradition of a Bayesian analysis
of the confirmatory value of varied evidence obtained by employing diverse
methods. In their contribution drawing on voting theory, it is the evidence
from diverse methods which supports the hypothesis of interest more strongly.
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Fig. 1 The three scenarios described in Bovens and Hartmann (2003) as depicted in Landes
and Osimani (2019): each row represents a scenario comparing two parallel strategies: B vs.
D in the upper row, A vs. C in the middle, and C vs. E in the lowest row.
2.2 Meta-Analysis
Meta-analysis is the branch of statistics concerned with how to amalgamate
evidence for hypotheses from many different individual studies, each typically
with their own analysis. A meta-analysis is, as it were, an analysis of analyses,
designed to produce a summary report on the evidence from varied sources.
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Even when scientific studies designed to measure an effect within a target pop-
ulation study are well-designed, their conclusions are still defeasible at least
because of the random variation within that population. In other words, ran-
dom variation in the data actually sampled can entail misleading conclusions
either for or against hypotheses and variation in estimated sizes of effects of in-
terest. But various asymptotic results in statistics provide some assurance that
the probability of being so mislead becomes smaller and smaller as more data
are collected—as the evidence accumulated from different statistical studies
is assessed together, instead of separately. Thus procedures for meta-analysis
are procedures for the amalgamation and assessment of (potentially) the total
statistical evidence available for hypotheses and effects.
The statistical and scientific literature on the technical aspects of how to
perform a meta-analysis is huge—see, e.g., Sutton et al (2001); Sutton and Hig-
gins (2008); Cumming (2012) for reviews—in contrast with the near complete
absence of discussion of those technical aspects’ conceptual and epistemolog-
ical foundations among philosophers of science—but see Kilinc (2012) and
Vieland and Chang (2018), the latter of whom raise interesting puzzles about
their epistemic justification. Rather, philosophical attention to meta-analysis
has so far focused on the role of the social structure of science in assessing the
cogency and objectivity of meta-analytic procedures, especially for biomedi-
cal research. This is due to the explicit recognition that the Evidence-Based
Medicine (EBM) community gives to meta-analysis of randomized controlled
trials (RCTs) at the top of proposed evidential hierarchies (Reiss and Ankeny,
2016, section 5). The general aim of this community is to promote quantita-
tive, statistical evidence for medical decision-making at the clinical level over
qualitative evidence such as case reports and expert consensus, which are con-
sidered fraught with bias and uncontrolled confounding factors. By contrast,
these potentials for misleading evidence can be (better) controlled in RCTs
and the meta-analysis thereof.
Although there is increasing philosophical analysis and critique of various
aspects of the EBM framework—see, e.g., Worrall (2007) for a review—meta-
analysis has been identified as one such aspect in need of greater attention
(Mebius et al, 2016). As one of the first philosophical analysis to focus on
meta-analysis in particular, Stegenga (2011) raises at least three sorts of im-
portant issues. First, meta-analysts seem to have many arbitrary choices to
make in order to complete their work, raising the specter of impotence or
conventionalism if their conclusions depend on the details of these choices.
Second, meta-analyses typically focus only on statistical data and so neglect
other important types of evidence, e.g., mechanistic evidence, which may be
especially relevant for policy and decision-making. Third, meta-analyses are
not immune to the damaging effects of publication bias, p-hacking, experi-
menter degrees of freedom, and other questionable research practices whose
trace in the published literature can be difficult to detect, thereby impugning
its objectivity and claim (within EBM) to evidential superiority.
In this special issue, Holman (2018) explicitly defends meta-analysis, point-
ing out that once one conceives of it as a developing process rather than a static
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technique, some of the charges against it are no longer apropos, while others
can be resolved after periods of problem solving. Wu¨thrich and Steele (2018)
are also interested in defending the utility of meta-analytic methods, especially
in cases where automation becomes necessary due to the super-large-scale data
involved. In these cases, careful problem solving cannot be done on a case-by-
case basis and must instead be built into the automated aggregation algorithm;
they suggest amenability to robustness analysis (section 2.3) is an important
aspect of design.
2.3 Robustness/Sensitivity Analysis
The notion of robustness comes in different shapes and forms (Lloyd, 2015;
Jones, 2018; Schupbach, 2018; Staley, 2004; Weisberg, 2006; Woodward, 2006).
Weisberg delineates a four-step procedure of mathematical robustness analysis.
In the first step, a group of models is examined to determine if they all make
the same prediction and if they are sufficiently diverse. The second step aims at
finding the common structure which generates the prediction. The third step is
the relating of the model predictions to the real world (on which cf. section 2.4).
The final step is to conduct an analysis to investigate conditions which defeat
the prediction.
Wilde and Parkkinen (2018) expand on Weisberg’s first step. But rather
than constraining themselves to a robustness of mathematical models, they
also consider varying modeling assumptions, detection methods and experi-
mental set-ups (such as experimental species)—see Culp (1995) for more on
robustness and experimental set-ups. Woodward (2006) calls this derivational
robustness, whose confirmational value has recently been argued for by Ero-
nen (2015); Kuorikoski et al (2012); Lehtinen (2018). Again we find a notion
of diversity playing a key role: the more divergent the group of experimen-
tal species for which a robust result is found, the less likely the observations
are owed to idiosyncrasies of the individual species—in other words, the more
likely it is that the observed phenomenon is also manifest in the species of
interest. It is an intuition concerning the weight of the variety of evidence
(section 2.1) which confirms the hypothesis of interest via extrapolation (sec-
tion 2.4). Schupbach (2018) also traces intuitions regarding extrapolation back
to intuitions concerning variety of evidence expounded in Horwich (1982).
Derivational robustness is also the most basic form of the fourth step in
Weisberg’s procedure. Intuitively, changing a single or few parameter values by
a fraction only changes the conclusions minimally, if at all. (Raerinne (2013)
is careful to distinguish procedures like sensitivity analysis from other types
of robustness analysis.) In mathematics, this notion is often formalized as the
continuity of a function. By contrast, in situations with manifold discontinu-
ities, reliable predictions become all but impossible as chaos reigns. In between
these extreme scenarios, chaos theory may be applied in situations with some
discontinuities.
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In scientific practice, such robustness analysis is often carried out via the
execution of Monte Carlo algorithms on a computer (Lagoa and Barmish, 2002;
Rubinstein and Kroese, 2016). Roughly speaking, such algorithms probabilis-
tically explore how one’s conclusions change for different input and parameter
values. Wu¨thrich and Steele (2018) argue that evidence amalgamation algo-
rithms ought to be assessed by considering the kind of robustness analysis,
thusly understood, that can be performed; the possibility space associated
with the robustness analysis is revealing of the basic structure of the algo-
rithm.
By contrast, Kao (2018) employs a notion of robustness to support the
development or discovery of a theory or hypothesis rather than its evaluation.
She points out that attempting to generalize specific hypotheses for concrete
domains to further areas of application is a viable heuristic research strategy
which sheds light on the possible unifying work that a generalized hypothe-
sis may do. Furthermore, determining boundaries limiting the scope of such
generalized hypotheses may help our understanding of the epistemic values of
scientific hypotheses. The search for boundaries outside which the theory no
longer holds is a search for defeaters—the fourth step in Weisberg’s robustness
analysis.
2.4 Extrapolation and External Validity
There are many examples in the sciences in which evidence is collected to
support a hypothesis about a certain system, but this system is not directly
accessible for financial, ethical, or technical reasons. In these cases, surrogate
model systems stand in as test objects in experiments, and experimental find-
ings are then transferred from the model system to the target system. This
type of inference is called extrapolation.
Obviously, the concept of extrapolation brings with it a host of interest-
ing and difficult questions, such as “what is a model?” and “how do models
represent?”, touching philosophical issues such as the problem of induction
(as some gap between model and target must be leaped over), the status of
universal laws (as the model and target may not fall under the same law),
and the nature of causation (since it is almost always causal knowledge that
is extrapolated). Another persistent problem is the question of what degree of
contextualization is needed for a successful transfer of knowledge, especially in
the biomedical sciences with large, complex, and dynamical systems that come
with all kinds of redundant mechanisms. Moreover, the philosophical debates
around the nature of similarity, relevance, and analogy cannot be neglected
here, either.
The concept of extrapolation is tightly entangled with questions about in-
ternal and external validity. When an experiment is performed on an animal
model or a study conducted on a test population (which in medical settings is
sometimes quite small), a causal claim can only be established if the experi-
mental set-up or the study design is judged internally valid, i.e., it was really
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C which caused E in the setting M . (See also the debate around randomized
controlled trials described in sections 2.2 and 2.6.) When the experiment or
study goes beyond M and is deemed externally valid in that the causal link
between C and E does not only hold in M alone, then causal knowledge about
M might be justifiably extrapolated to some distinct target setting/popula-
tion T . The question of whether this transfer is permissible for a given M -T
pair is dubbed the problem of extrapolation—e.g., transferring causal knowl-
edge about a drug’s effects from animal models to humans might be sensitive
to certain particularities of the study setting (such as age, co-morbidity, etc.
in the study’s sample).
In his discussion of mechanistic reasoning for the purpose of extrapola-
tion, Steel (2008, p. 78) presents the following additional challenge any viable
account of extrapolation ought to address:
[A]dditional information about the similarity between the model and
the target—for instance, that the relevant mechanisms are the same in
both—is needed to justify the extrapolation. The extrapolator’s circle
is the challenge of explaining how we could acquire this additional in-
formation, given the limitations on what we can know about the target.
In other words, it needs to be explained how we could know that the
model and the target are similar in causally relevant respects without
already knowing the causal relationship in the target.
(See also Guala (2010).) Different proposals have been put forward to evade
this circle, including mechanistic reasoning (e.g., Steel (2008) on comparative
process tracing) or analogical reasoning in a Bayesian framework (Poellinger,
2018). Reiss’s contribution in this issue (2018) offers an overview of strate-
gies to tackle the problem of extrapolation, while Reiss himself proposes an
alternative pragmatist, contextualist perspective on evidential support for an
inaccessible target system. Comparative process tracing is picked up again
by Wilde and Parkkinen (2018) as a way of basing extrapolation on mecha-
nistic reasoning to show how both probabilistic and mechanistic information
can be transferred at once when establishing a causal claim about a human
target population. Frank (2018) adds an ethical dimension to the discussion
by shifting the focus to reasoning under uncertainty when results from locally
validated models of climate change-related economic effects are extrapolated.
2.5 Evidence Amalgamation and Theory Development
It is natural, as many of the previous sections have done, to consider evi-
dence amalgamation as pertaining to the confirmation of scientific theories
and hypotheses. But beyond its role in the logic of scientific justification, it
also figures in the logic of scientific discovery. (Here, “logic” is understood in
a broad sense as a form of rational inquiry.) Whewell (1840) was one of the
first to distinguish the process of conceiving of a theory or hypothesis from the
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bulk of the establishment of its empirical support. He identified three stages
to scientific inquiry, as we would call it today:1
1. the “happy thought,” or the event of the novel insight or idea properly so
called;
2. the “colligation” of facts and ideas, or the further formation and matura-
tion of the happy thought by its relation and integration into other ideas
and known data; and
3. the verification of the colligation, meaning the judgment of its explanatory
and predictive power and its simplicity compared with its “consilience,”
that is, its unifying range of application.
The first, and possibly also the second, of these steps are included in the
modern conception of scientific discovery.2 Clearly, the role of amalgamating
diverse evidence figures most centrally in the second and third steps, hence in
discovery itself insofar as the second step is included therein. In this special
issue, Kao (2018) focuses on this second step with the example of the devel-
opment of the early quantum theory, showing how versions of the quantum
hypothesis guided further experimental results, which in turn constrained their
scope.
For much of the twentieth century, however, most (but not all) philosophers
saw the process of scientific discovery as an essentially creative phenomenon
beyond the purview of philosophy of science, whose task was to delineate
the normative constraints on the scientific endeavor. Only in the 1970s did
philosophers devote noticeably more attention to it (Schickore, 2014). An early
exception was Hanson (1958, 1960, 1965), who articulated a theory of discov-
ery as abduction, whereby diverse phenomena, particularly those unexplained,
are unified as following from the truth of a certain hypothesis. To the extent
that this hypothesis amalgamates diverse evidence, it is a good candidate for
further investigation. Although Hanson cited Charles Sanders Peirce as inspi-
ration, there is clear continuity with Whewell’s conception. Further, Magnani
(2001, 2009) has later emphasized that abduction needn’t be used to select a
single hypothesis once and for all—that is, as a mode of inference properly so
called—but can also be used creatively to generate or refine further hypothe-
ses.3 Whether one views this abduction as a “logic” in any relevant sense,
such unifying or abductive reasoning concerns the developments and pursuits
of hypotheses and theories rather than their direct support or justification. In
this special issue, Bertolaso and Sterpetti (2018) follow this line of argument
concerning how cancer researchers should pursue theories of carcinogenesis
according to their plausibility.
1 Whewell referred to the whole process as that of scientific discovery, reflecting the older
usage of that sense of “discovery” as broad inquiry.
2 Cf. Laudan (1980), who prefers to distinguish all three, calling the second the context
of pursuit.
3 See also Schaffner (1993), who sees this use of abduction as a “weak” evaluation pro-
cedure, providing more evidence of scientific promise rather than confirmation.
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2.6 Causal Inference
After—and despite—Russell’s famous, skeptical wholesale rejection of the con-
cept of causation (Russell, 1912), the past hundred years have seen a surge in
approaches towards (more or less) formally explicating cause-effect relation-
ships. Reductive or non-reductive in nature, none of the explications or defini-
tions rests on a single marker: probabilistic accounts (Suppes, 1970; Reichen-
bach, 1971) combine information about two events’ correlational and temporal
relations, prominent causal graph accounts (Pearl, 2000; Spirtes et al, 2000;
Woodward, 2003) aim at the integration of knowledge about probabilistic re-
lations and underlying (spatio-temporal) mechanisms, and process theorists
about causation build on descriptions of physical mechanisms and difference-
making information, either in terms of energy transfer (Salmon, 1984) or a sys-
tem’s counterfactual development (Dowe, 2009). In applied settings, several of
these can be combined: the Russo-Williamson Thesis (Russo and Williamson,
2007) captures the desideratum to enrich probabilistic data (as gleaned from
RCTs) with mechanistic information towards the establishment of justifiable
causal claims in medicine—for a discussion of the thesis see Wilde and Parkki-
nen (2018) in this issue.
Let us briefly take a closer look at the causal graph account. The causal
modeler might start by synthesizing probabilistic data from databases, back-
ground information, common sense, and expert knowledge. These different
sources might provide both structural/mechanistic as well as parametric (or
also distributional) information about the relations between different factors.
Causal learning algorithms can help in discovering unsuspected relationships,
but the integration of expert knowledge becomes even more important as the
number of investigated variables grows and computational tractability quickly
gets out of hand. Moreover, a larger causal theory might be constructed as a
patchwork theory by combining smaller, local structures collected from differ-
ent experiments, different research groups, or even different branches of science
(Mayo-Wilson, 2018). When dynamic information is added to the mix in the
aggregation of time-series data, a host of new inferential problems arises (as
discussed in Danks and Plis 2018). Interesting conceptual and computational
innovation towards solutions to these problems and in synthesizing ideas is in-
creasingly driven by exchange between computer scientists and philosophers.
But, if one takes a skeptical stance towards such a monistic explication of
cause and effect, advocating instead for a pluralist explication, one should be
prepared to amalgamate causal evidence in a fundamentally particularist way.
For example, in her critique of the causal graph approach, Cartwright (2004,
pp. 814–815) dismisses this “monolithic” account as too formal and “thin” and
advocates richer terminology closer to experimental practice:
[T]here is an untold variety of quantities that can be involved in laws,
so too there is an untold variety of causal relations. Nature is rife with
very specific causal laws involving these causal relations, laws that we
represent most immediately using content-rich causal verbs: the pistons
compress the air in the carburetor chamber, the sun attracts the planets,
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the loss of skill among long-term unemployed workers discourages firms
from opening new jobs. . . . These are genuine facts, but more concrete
than those reported in claims that use only the abstract vocabulary of
“cause” and “prevent.” If we overlook this, we will lose a vast amount
of information that we otherwise possess: important, useful information
that can help us with crucial questions of design and control.
Thus, for the causal pluralist, amalgamation of varied evidence is necessary
to preserve rich information about the causal system under investigation. (See
also Reiss’s sketch of his pragmatist-contextualist theory of evidence for causal
inference in Reiss 2018.)
3 Contributions
3.1 Claveau and Grenier on the Surprising Failure of the Variety of Evidence
Thesis
Claveau and Grenier (2018) follows up on Claveau (2013) in offering more nu-
anced understandings of varied evidence in the sense of Bovens and Hartmann
(2003) and section 2.1. In this tradition, instruments are assumed to be ei-
ther α) fully reliable, delivering perfect information about what they measure,
upon which one can deduce infallibly the consequences, or β) fully unreliable
in that they do not provide any information whatsoever (reports from these
instruments are random and mutually independent). As Claveau (2013) notes,
real scientific instruments do not work like this.
Claveau (2013) models unreliable instruments as biased instruments that
either always create reports that the hypothesis of interest is true or always
create reports that the hypothesis of interest is false. Eliminating the testable
consequence variables from the models, Claveau (2013, Section 4) shows that
a natural formalization of the Variety of Evidence Thesis holds in his models.
In a second step, he drops the assumption of Bovens and Hartmann that
the reliability variables are either fully independent or not independent at all.
He discovers situations in which reliability variables have intermediate degrees
of independence, for which the Variety of Evidence Thesis fails.
In their contribution, Claveau and Grenier (2018) extend this analysis by
first re-introducing the testable-consequence variables into the models and
then dropping the assumptions that these variables are either fully depen-
dent or fully independent. These, so far, most general models, are depicted in
Figure 2.
Within this general model, they show that a variety of possible understand-
ings of the Variety of Evidence Thesis fail for a large set of plausible priors.
In a natural sense, the set in which the Variety of Evidence Thesis fails is
much larger in Claveau and Grenier (2018) than it is in Claveau (2013). Con-
sequently, the conclusions drawn for the thesis are less favorable in Claveau
and Grenier (2018) than in Claveau (2013).
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Fig. 2 The most general model of Claveau and Grenier (2018) with evidence variables and
consequence variables that are dependent to some degree.
3.2 Heesen et al in Praise of Methodological Triangulation
Heesen et al (2018) are interested in the work of Du Bois (1996/1899) concern-
ing the question, “What do Negroes earn?” (To avoid anachronism, they follow
Du Bois’ terminology in using “Negro” rather than the more contemporary
“African-American.”) To make progress in answering this question for house-
holds, they consider four methods for gathering information: 1) conducting
interviews, 2) combining the average income for the professions represented
in a given household, 3) using family members’ estimations of time lost to
work, given their occupation, and 4) judging the appearance of the home and
occupants, rent paid, and the presence of lodgers. They are then interested in
how to aggregate answers obtained from these different methods.
Heesen et al (2018) delineate i) a purist strategy—single out a method
and believe whatever this method finds—from ii) a triangulation strategy—
believe what most methods find and break ties by randomly picking from best
supported findings. They show that the triangulation strategy has a greater
probability of yielding the correct answer than the purist strategy for m ≥ 3
methods and n ≥ 2 possible answers. Furthermore, this probability for the
triangulation strategy increases with the number of methods m. Their model
hence underwrites an understanding of the Variety of Evidence Thesis in which
variety is understood as the employment of a variety of methods to support
one’s inferences.
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Interestingly, their model can almost be understood in terms of the Bovens
and Hartmann framework. The first ingredient of such a model is an n-ary
propositional variable HY P . Second, one considers m different propositional
consequence variables CON which can take the same values as HY P . The
relevant conditional probabilities satisfy P (Con = con|HY P = hyp) = 1 if
and only if con = hyp—that is, the consequences are perfect indicators of the
hypothesis. Every consequence variable CON has a different single child E of
arity n for which P (E = ei|Con = coni) > P (E = ej |Con = coni) holds for all
j 6= i, see the left-hand graph in Figure 3. Landes (2018, Section 6) shows that,
under suitable ceteris paribus conditions, the posterior Bayesian probability
in the correct answer increases in m when n ≥ 2, even if the consequences are
not perfect indicators of the hypothesis.
HYP
CON1 . . . CONm
E1 . . . Em
HYP
CON1
E1
Fig. 3 The triangulation and purist strategies described by Heesen et al (2018) within the
Bovens and Hartmann (2003) framework.
The crucial difference between these two approaches is how varied evidence
is used to update beliefs. Heesen et al (2018) employ a triangulation strategy
while Bovens and Hartmann (2003) update using Bayesian conditionalization.
Those with very strong intuitions for the Variety of Evidence Thesis may thus
feel compelled to give up on Bayesian updating.
Since the proofs of Heesen et al (2018) heavily draw on voting theory
(List and Goodin, 2001), we have hence connected voting theory to variety of
evidence reasoning. It is tempting to speculate about deep connections between
the two. These connections, if they exist, are as yet unexplored.
3.3 Holman in Defense of Meta-analysis
In his contribution, Holman (2018) mounts a spirited defense of meta-analysis
as a flexible toolkit to amalgamate data for (medical) decision making, against
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criticisms from Stegenga (2011), Jukola (2015), Romero (2016), Holman and
Bruner (2017), and Jukola (2017). He argues that worries raised for meta-
analysis can be dealt with by the rich meta-analytic toolkit and that worries
concerning the objectivity of meta-analysis either pose a major threat to all
other forms of evidence amalgamation, too, or impose an unreasonably high
standard. Crucially, though, he understands his argument as a defense of, but
not an argument for, meta-analysis.
In more detail, Holman (2018) understands meta-analysis as an ongoing
process, much like other scientific methods. The process is ongoing in two re-
spects: i) the available evidence accumulates over time, which may bring reso-
lution to disputed issues, and ii) the meta-analytic tools themselves as well as
tools to assess meta-analyses improve over time. While there may be disagree-
ment between competing meta-analyses at any given time, there is good hope
that the disagreement will disappear over time either due to new evidence com-
ing to light or by detecting virtues and flaws in the present meta-analyses. So,
meta-analysis is not a tool which meets the unreasonable standard of instant
elimination of disagreement but it is rather the ongoing process of scientific
inquiry which leads to the eventual elimination of disagreement over time.
Next, he turns to issues arising from considering meta-analysis as a social
practice, acknowledging the importance of assessing the impact of industry
funding and publication bias. He first considers concerns raised by Jukola
(2015, 2017), regarding worryingly skewed data from the FDA. She hence
pointed out that even a well-conducted meta-analysis on the skewed data pro-
duces a systematically biased result. Holman (2018) addresses this worry by
pointing to meta-analytic tools for detecting skewed data—PRISMA and fun-
nel plots. Recent computer simulations by Romero (2016) make a point similar
to Jukola’s. Holman (2018) argues that applying the p-uniform technique in
Romero’s implicit meta-analysis would have been the best practice to mitigate
effects of biased publications.
Holman (2018) thinks that it is rational in practical terms to violate the
Principle of Total Evidence (Carnap, 1947) in medical inference. Firstly, there
are many cases in which ignoring non-RCT studies has produced the right
results, by the light of history. Secondly, research in cognitive psychology sug-
gest that we tend to interpret complex information in ways that fit our view
of the world. So, focusing on smaller bodies of high quality evidence reduces
the risk of biased interpretations.
3.4 Vieland and Chang on Conceptual Problems for Classical Meta-Analysis
The Fisherian approach to classical statistics determines what one might call
the “evidential bearing” of a data set against a hypothesis according to how
extreme the data set is compared with what is expected under the hypothesis.
In other words, the data are interpreted as evidence against an hypothesis to
the extent that the data do not fit it. For example, in an experiment of ten
independent coin flips, there is evidence against the hypothesis that the coin
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is fair to the extent that the number of heads (say) differs from five. This
evidence against the hypothesis of fairness is often quantified by a p-value,
the probability of measuring data at least as extreme as the data actually
observed, if the hypothesis were true.4 The question then arises: how does one
amalgamate the evidence across many statistical studies against a hypothesis?
If the p-value measures the evidence, then this question becomes: how should
one combine p-values? Doing so justifiably is the goal of classical meta-analysis.
In their contribution, Vieland and Chang (2018) draw philosophers’ atten-
tion to neglected conceptual problems involved in these procedures for classical
meta-analysis, even when one focuses on the simplest case of multiple inde-
pendent replicates of the same study type, design, and size. They show that
three different procedures for meta-analysis—what they call p-averaging, r-
averaging, and replication counting (along with their likelihood-ratio-measure
analogs)—all have problems being justified as an evidence amalgamation pro-
cedure or conflict with what they call the “measurement amalgamation prin-
ciple” (MAP), that the inputs and outputs of an amalgamation procedure
should be on the same measurement scale, with a meaningful interpretation
vis-a`-vis the evidence.
P-averaging, which they attribute to Fisher (1925), satisfies the first clause
of MAP, as it outputs the p-value associated with a certain statistic pro-
portional to the sum of the logarithms of the p-values of the input studies.
But there are reasons to doubt that it satisfies the second clause, calling into
question whether the p-value was a measure of evidence in a single study in
the first place. In r-averaging, on the other hand, certain aspects of the data
themselves are first amalgamated and then the p-value is calculated for this
larger data set, resulting in a procedure that fails to satisfy the first clause of
MAP. Finally, they consider binary classification schemes, which coarse-grain
the evidence provided by statistical studies into those that support the rejec-
tion of a certain hypothesis or not, depending on whether their p-values are
below or above a fixed threshold, respectively. Simply put, these schemes are
so coarse that it is hard to justify how they could be reliable procedures for
amalgamating evidence.
While Vieland and Chang (2018) do not offer a positive proposal to over-
come these problems, they describe in some detail various constraints on po-
tential solutions and directions for future research, such as the connection with
parameter estimation.
3.5 Wu¨thrich and Steele on Automated Evidence Aggregation
Wu¨thrich and Steele (2018) are concerned with evaluating procedures for ag-
gregating ever-larger bodies of evidence. The rapid growth of available data
4 Technically, the p-value is of a statistic of the data, which orders the possible data by
increasing extremeness. Typically data is taken to be extreme to the extent that it has low
probability (or low probability density).
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will eventually require the application of automated evidence aggregators im-
plemented as computer algorithms. Recent work by Hunter and Williams
(2012) in automated aggregation of medical data serves as a case study to
their philosophical questions.
They are particularly interested in how to choose the proper extent of au-
tomation. They first argue that it is non-trivial to determine criteria which
allow to specify an/the appropriate extent of automation in any particular
application. However, they do put forward and defend one criterion for assess-
ing the reliability of evidence aggregation algorithms: the capacity to perform
adequate robustness analysis.
But why is such a criterion necessary? Can we not simply assess the track
record of these algorithms? Unfortunately, this is often not possible in the
medical domain when one attempts to determine a priori the best treatment
option for a particular patient at a given time. There are at least three reasons
why this may not be possible: a) there is no way to go back in time and check
whether the other treatment options would have been any better, b) while
the data were correctly amalgamated, it was the raw data themselves which
were misleading, and c) the available good data were correctly assessed but
the patient belongs to a rare sub-group in which the indicated treatment is—
surprisingly—a lot less beneficial than in the general population.
So, by “robustness analysis” Wu¨thrich and Steele (2018) refer to a rel-
atively simple notion of robustness in terms of varying parameter values or
“dial settings.” They argue that designing large-scale evidence aggregation
algorithms with the possibility of such robustness analysis has two crucial ad-
vantages: it becomes clear from early on in the design process i) which (types
of) uncertainty can be subjected to robustness analysis by “turning the dial”
and ii) which types of uncertainty cannot be subjected to robustness analysis
because there is no “dial” one could turn. This directs attention to the struc-
ture of the algorithm—the choice and organization of the dials. Thus, it also
increases transparency of the inner workings of the algorithm.
Wu¨thrich and Steele (2018) point out that in actual practice, further com-
plications arise due to limited (computational and other data processing) re-
sources. An evidence aggregation algorithm may produce better results by a
deeper analysis of a smaller data set than by a shallower analysis of a larger
data set. These complications notwithstanding, they argue that the assess-
ment of an automated evidence aggregator is to be assessed by focusing on
robustness analyses.
3.6 Wilde and Parkkinen on Extrapolation and the Russo-Williamson Thesis
In their contribution, Wilde and Parkkinen (2018) take a closer look at the
so-called Russo-Williamson Thesis (RWT), which can be understood as a pro-
grammatic claim about the importance of evidential variety in causal assess-
ment. In its strong formulation, the thesis says that, for the establishment of
a causal claim, both knowledge of the existence of a causal mechanism and
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knowledge of a suitable correlation must be established (Clarke et al, 2014,
p. 343). This thesis, so its authors claim, is supported by research practice, and
especially by work done at the International Agency for Research on Cancer
(IARC), where multiple research groups work on different sources of evidence
for or against the carcinogenicity of various substances. When separate re-
search groups arrive at a conclusion, these findings are combined in order
to categorize the investigated substance as carcinogenic to humans (category
1), probably carcinogenic to humans (category 2A), possibly carcinogenic to
humans (category 2B), not classifiable as to its carcinogenicity to humans
(category 3), or probably not carcinogenic to humans (category 4). Although
the IARC’s way of reasoning can be understood to be in accordance with the
RWT, various seeming counterexamples to this practice have been pointed
out in the recent discussion. Wilde and Parkkinen briefly mention the case of
the carcinogenicity of processed meat, where the classification was seemingly
based on correlational evidence alone. One answer to this deviation in practice
might be a call for correction (i.e., emphasizing the importance of mechanistic
evidence, as in Leuridan and Weber (2011)), while an alternative answer might
be a reinterpretation of the the case: Clarke et al (2014, p. 343) point out that
a study of sufficient quality may provide correlational information and at the
same time rule out the possibility of confounding and bias.
Wilde and Parkkinen (2018) investigate a second case, the causal link be-
tween benzo[a]pyrene and cancer in humans. In this case, benzo[a]pyrene was
classified by the IARC as carcinogenic to humans without an established cor-
relation in humans. In defense of IARC’s practice and the RWT, they show
how evidence from animal studies can possibly yield both correlational and
mechanistic information about humans through mechanism-based extrapola-
tion from experimental animal models to the human target population (Steel,
2008, p. 85). In this special case, extrapolation is supported by particularly ro-
bust evidence from animal studies. The IARC protocols report eight species of
dissimilar non-human model animals, with the experimental results remaining
stable across species and therefore likely to be due to a common causal feature
of all experimental set-ups: the underlying phenomenon, i.e., the carcinogenic-
ity of benzo[a]pyrene. In this sense, the IARC practice can be understood as
being in accordance with the RWT again, after all: evidence from animal mod-
els can be reliably transferred from animals to humans via mechanism-based
extrapolation and thus provide both probabilistic and mechanistic information
for the establishment of a causal claim about the human target population.
3.7 Frank on the Ethics of Economic Extrapolation from Uncertain Climate
Models
Frank (2018) discusses ethical issues involving risk reporting where scientists
extrapolate from locally validated models. In particular, he is interested in
extrapolated estimates of cost and damage within so-called Integrated Assess-
ment Models of the economic effects of climate change. The varied evidence
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that goes into constructing these models—e.g., the functional dependence of
warming on atmospheric carbon dioxide, the ability and efficacy of technology
to allow economies to adapt to and mitigate climate warming, and the effects
of more extreme warming on global security and scarcity of resources—entail
high uncertainty about these models’ predictions, especially since that evi-
dence is confined to relatively low amounts of global warming. Frank (2018)
expounds on the reasoning of Weitzman (2009), who critically observes that
such extrapolations have so far been based on analytic tractability rather than
some more evidentially justified reason. If the aforementioned high uncertainty
is taken in account, it tends to lead to “fat tails” in the probability distribu-
tions for catastrophic events, such as the end of civilization as we know it.5
This can then lead to negatively infinite, or arbitrarily large, expected value
for climate mitigation risks. The disconcerting conclusion that a rational ac-
tor should do anything and everything to mitigate such risks could perhaps be
avoided by placing an upper bound thereon using the technique of a statistical
value of a life multiplied by the world population, but this is controversial
because its coarseness has yet to be furnished with a justification.
Nevertheless, Frank (2018) argues that the Weitzman (2009) approach
should be taken seriously. Two ethical norms give it support: first, that scien-
tists should be sensitive to both the epistemic and non-epistemic consequences
of their research conclusions, managing risk therefrom accordingly, and second,
that their own uncertainty about their conclusions should be made especially
transparent for policy makers. Insofar as the fat-tailed approach is epistem-
ically permissible, researchers should represent that extreme uncertainty to
policy makers, on precautionary grounds (Steel, 2014). The risks associated
with overly aggressive climate change mitigation are simply dwarfed by those
with the collapse of civilization. While there are still uncertainties that remain
about how to balance epistemic and ethical values and risks, the argument for
the fat-tailed approach remains plausible.
3.8 Reiss Against External Validity
Reiss (2018) argues that understanding evidential reasoning in terms of exter-
nal validity may lead to poor inferential practice by encouraging the search
for epistemically easily accessible models, which are then used as the basis
for extrapolations. The alternative he proposes involves the attempt to under-
stand evidential reasoning about targets more directly. In criticizing evidential
reasoning in terms of external validity, Reiss first introduces the problem of
extrapolation, i.e., the question how knowledge of a causal relationship (about
a model system) gained in experimental circumstances can justifiably be trans-
ferred (extrapolated) to less accessible circumstances (the target system, often
the target population). He then presents solution strategies discussed in the lit-
erature to show that evidential reasoning based on external validity encourages
5 More technically, probability distributions with “fat tails” are ones over the real line
that asymptotically decay sub-exponentially, leading to undefined moments.
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foundationalist thinking about scientific inference: Learning whether C and E
are causally related in target system T requires taking the detour through the
experimentally accessible model system M . Yet, according to Reiss, founda-
tionalism only offers unsatisfactory answers to questions about a) how the basic
beliefs (inferences from experimental data) are justified, and b) how justified
basic beliefs about M also lend justification to beliefs about T .
As an alternative to external validity-based scientific reasoning, Reiss pro-
poses a pragmatist-contextualist perspective (Reiss, 2015): reasoning about a
target system T should center around the hypothesis and begin with the ques-
tion of what evidence is required in order to establish this very hypothesis. In
Reiss’s pragmatist framework, the hypotheses together with their context—
domain-specific information, purpose of the inquiry, norms, etc.—determine
what kind of evidence is needed to support the target causal claim, and what
counts as justification in this situation. Contextualism in this sense facilitates
reasoning from models without external validity. In a series of examples taken
from cancer research and IARC practice, Reiss illustrates the fruitfulness of the
contextualist approach: Experiments might suggest hypotheses in the discov-
ery stage, animal experiments may provide direct support for a hypothesis once
a suitable (domain-specific) bridge principle is available, animal experiments
might also refine hypotheses if they suggest a more specific causal relationship,
and analogies can be exploited if knowledge about the mechanisms involved is
available. All these inferential patterns facilitate the integration of evidence in
support of a causal hypothesis but do so without extrapolation or judgments
of external validity.
3.9 Bertolaso and Sterpetti on Plausibility and Cancer Research
Bertolaso and Sterpetti (2018) argue that the analytic view of theory devel-
opment (Cellucci, 2016, 2017) can shed novel light on how varied evidence
influences this development. According to this view, one ranks hypotheses
by their plausibility according to the following procedure: deduce conclusions
from the hypothesis, then compare the range of these conclusions with other
provisionally accepted hypotheses and data. Those that yield contradictions
are less plausible and so are provisionally rejected, while those that remain
are provisionally accepted. They argue that the plausibility concept is distinct
from probability, because it arises from the balance of reasoned arguments
for an hypothesis from diverse evidence, which is a non-quantitative relation.
This better explains the actual pronouncements of scientists regarding their
theories, who rarely give probabilistic estimates for them, and may go some
way to explain how different researchers assign different prior probabilities to
hypotheses. Because plausibility depends on an argumentative structure, they
emphasize that development cannot be fully automated without the input of
researchers, contra big data advocates such as Gagneur et al (2017). This in
turn has implications for the debate between frequentists and Bayesians about
RCTs.
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Bertolaso and Sterpetti (2018) illustrate their view using the current state
of the art in theories of carcinogenesis. The dominant Somatic Mutation The-
ory (SMT) posits that the cause of cancer is accumulated mutations in a cell
that lead to proliferation instead of the default state of quiescence. The mi-
nority Tissue Organization Field Theory (TOFT), on the other hand, posits
that the cause of cancer is abnormally imbalanced interactions among adjacent
cells and tissues, whose default state is rather proliferation. SMT and TOFT
are rivals insofar as they posit different default states for cells, resulting in
different assessments of the mutations found in cancer cells: either a cause
(SMT) or an effect (TOFT). But there is difficulty finding decisive evidence
for or against either theory. In the case of SMT, for example, researchers have
used big data sets to search for driver mutations, the mutations allegedly re-
sponsible for carcinogenesis. However, the interpretation of the data as such
evidence requires accepting the SMT in the first place. So this search is not
best understood as for a probabilistic confirmation of SMT over TOFT, but
as the articulation of a plausibility argument for it; conversely, proponents of
TOFT mount arguments according to which the data can be explained by
their theory.
3.10 Kao on Unification for Theory Development
Unification, as the process of bringing together a disparate set of phenomena
under a common understanding, has long been recognized as one strategy
for explanation, as has the abductive inference to the hypothesis or theory
providing that understanding as a method of confirmation or justification.
Kao (2018) reminds us that seeking such unification also provides a strategy
for theory development—cf. section 2.5. Here Kao appeals to the second stage
of the inductive method of Whewell (1840, 1858), the “colligation of facts”
by which an idea is elaborated and delineated. The initial articulation of an
idea does not always yield a precise hypothesis or entail a definite theory.
Attempts to unify phenomena under an idea therefore help delineate the scope
and content of an hypothesis or theory: how broadly applicable the idea is,
and what it is in detail. As a heuristic, unification is distinct from confirmation
or a commitment to any broad unity of science, because failures to unify can
delineate the scope and content of a theory, too. Finally, Kao compares this
sort of unification with uses of robustness analysis to develop a theory rather
than confirm it.
To illustrate this thesis, Kao examines the quantum hypothesis in the early
quantum theory of Planck (1967/1900), Einstein (1967/1905, 1907), and Bohr
(1913) from 1900–1913. As Planck (1967/1900) originally formulated it in the
context of describing the blackbody radiation spectrum, the quantum hypoth-
esis was ambiguous, as an assumption of discreteness, between the states of
elemental constituents of the blackbody and their energy. Einstein (1967/1905)
then extended this idea to electromagnetic radiation itself, rather than just the
material part of a matter-radiation system as Planck (1967/1900) had applied
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it. In the other direction—that is, regarding matter only without radiation—
Einstein (1907) applied it to the energy spectrum of atoms in diamond. Now,
the quantum hypothesis entails the existence of a constant, h, in units of which
the energy of vibratory phenomena (at some frequency ν) are discretized, but
the scope of the universality of this constant was unclear. It was Bohr (1913)
who extended this scope to provide the information needed to calculate the
characteristic size of atoms. However, the proposed extension of Debye and
Sommerfeld (1913) to quantize the duration of an energy exchange process in
an electric field was not born out by experiments. This showed the quantum
hypothesis was delimited to the descriptions of systems rather than temporal
processes.
3.11 Danks and Plis on Amalgamating Evidence of Dynamics
Danks and Plis (2018) turn their attention to the problem of amalgamating
statistical time-series data. The authors note that in many cases where large
datasets are compiled over long durations by different teams possibly mea-
suring different parameters with different methods at different time scales,
merging the resulting databases is highly desirable but hampered by technical
problems. One step towards amalgamating information about the behavior of
complex, dynamical systems (as, e.g., in neuroscience, econometrics, clima-
tology, etc.) is to integrate different studies not at the level of data but, in
a move to sidestep some evidence amalgamation challenges, at the structural
level precisely because the underlying causal structure remains invariant across
studies. However, how well structural causal knowledge can be amalgamated
in the end relies on how well the causal structure can be extracted from the
raw data. In the case of extracting such structural information from time-
series data, two challenges arise on which the authors focus: 1) there might
be a mismatch between the measurement timescale and the causal timescale,
and 2) latent, unobserved variables might confound dynamical systems over
temporal durations.
Danks and Plis illustrate the first challenge with an example from brain
research, where measurement timescales of different methods deviate signifi-
cantly: magnetoencephalography takes a measurement each 1 ms, while fMRI
data is sampled with one measurement every 2000 ms. As a result, causal
structures with different underlying causal time-steps will be extracted from
their respective databases. Danks and Plis visualize the loss of information
(i.e., “disconnectedness”) through undersampling in causal graphs and dis-
cuss algorithmic approaches towards learning causal timescale structure from
measurement timescale data (for known and unknown undersampling rates).
The second challenge consists in amalgamating different causal structures
into one global structure in the presence of unobserved latent influences. In
particular, if the sets of measured variables differ between studies, we know
that not all variables are measured in all experiments. Most importantly, such
unmeasured variables might act as confounders. Yet, recovering latent struc-
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tures from time-series data is made even more difficult by the problem of
underdetermination: How many latent variables? How many self-loops? How
many time-steps from cause to effect? To tackle this second challenge, Danks
and Plis propose to extend the causal structures extracted from time-series
data to minimally enriched (“simplest”) networks expressing causal influence
through latent variables over temporal distances. Danks and Plis discuss con-
crete algorithmic solutions that can finally help in merging the resulting causal
structures.
3.12 Mayo-Wilson on Causal Collages and Piecemeal Experimentation
Mayo-Wilson (2018) also focuses on causal learning, in particular on how to
combine the results of smaller studies into larger causal collages. Such prac-
tice is quite common in medicine and in the social sciences where researchers
often confine their attention to a limited set of variables first and combine the
inferred causal knowledge with other researchers’ results later. Mayo-Wilson’s
discussion builds on earlier work (Mayo-Wilson, 2011, 2014) showing that in
combining causal knowledge inferred from observational studies (which might
in many instances be the only option due to ethical, financial, or technical con-
straints), information might be lost—in other words, causal theories might be
significantly underdetermined by evidence when observational data is gathered
piecemeal in contrast to comeasuring more (or all) variables at once. Mayo-
Wilson (2018) argues that this “problem of piecemeal induction” persists even
when interventions in a given setting are possible. He then investigates three
interrelated questions regarding this problem.
Firstly, Mayo-Wilson asks what type of information (and how much) is
lost in the piecemeal aggregation of evidence for the purpose of constructing
a causal theory. As soon as experimentation is possible, no information is lost
regarding the direction of the “causal flow.” Nevertheless, depending on the
connectedness of the true causal structure, quite some information regarding
the presence (or absence) of causal connections can be lost.
Yet, in which cases does no information loss occur when merging the results
of multiple studies? Mayo-Wilson (2018) shows that underdetermination of
the inferred causal theory can be eliminated if the graph of the true causal
structure contains relatively few edges.
Lastly, Mayo-Wilson asks how often the problem of underdetermination
arises. Unfortunately, experimental interventions do not reduce the underde-
termination rate (in contrast to inference from observational data) when the
number of variables in the causal graph becomes large (as is the case in many
real-world settings, especially in medicine or sociology).
Balancing his skeptical outlook on the fruitfulness of interventions for
causal learning, Mayo-Wilson remarks that scientists usually build their inves-
tigations on more than just probabilistic knowledge or facts about conditional
independencies: Most importantly, domain-specific knowledge (such as plausi-
bility constraints) might be available and useful in reducing underdetermina-
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tion of inferred theories, but further knowledge about the variables under inves-
tigation (e.g., a variable’s arity, distribution type, functional description, etc.)
may also be used in selecting plausible theory candidates. Mayo-Wilson (2018)
discusses important distributional assumptions that help in disambiguating
causal theories, for example when two causal theories (i.e., two causal graphs)
are not distinguishable by their conditional independence information, but can
be told apart when known facts about marginal distributions are compatible
with only one of the graphs. He concludes by hinting at important questions
left open.
3.13 Baetu on Multidisciplinary Models and Inter-level Causation
There is a long tradition in philosophy of science and philosophy of mind that
understands reality, or at least our description or explanations thereof, in terms
of different levels. Different scientific disciplines, despite using vastly different
vocabulary to describe phenomena and the world, are not in direct conflict if
one understands the targets of their investigations to be separated into distinct
and separate strata (Cat, 2017). For example, psychology concerns phenomena
at the psychological level, chemistry, the chemical level, and so on. Moreover,
levels are ordered by supervenience relations: e.g., the psychological level su-
pervenes on the chemical level. However, Baetu (2018) points out that many
causal models used in multidisciplinary scientific investigations in fact relate
causal variables at apparently different levels. Is this in conflict with the usual
supervenience thesis? Baetu (2018) argues rather that these multidisciplinary
models should be conceived as level-neutral, rather than multi-level models,
for the empirical criteria for inclusion among the models’ variable, viz. their
susceptibility to effective intervention (Woodward, 2003), are the same. Thus,
level-neutrality follows from the epistemic parity of the causal factors, which
is a distinct feature of experimental models. Thus, while this doesn’t eliminate
the philosophical problems about how to relate levels of explanation, it does
show that this problem, and issues related to level interaction more generally,
are theoretical rather than practical.
As an example, Baetu (2018) considers biopsychosocial models of pain (As-
mundson and Wright, 2004; Craig and Versloot, 2011). These models include
a variety of physiological, psychological, sociological, and cultural factors de-
termining pain experience as a phenomena that can be the target of medical
intervention. Some of these incorporate neural circuit mechanisms, but inter-
acting with higher-order cognitive features as well as factors describing social
and cultural determinants of perception and responses to pain, such as (per-
ceptions of) spousal support. Such models are supported by experimental data
from brain legion and hypnotic suggestion patients that the mechanisms for
sensory perception of pain experience are in fact distinct from the affective as-
pects of that experience. Nevertheless, these models do not provide complete
explanations for pain experience, nor are they intended to; they are rather
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effective and useful summaries of the pathways of dependence relevant for
effective intervention by medical and psychiatric practitioners.
4 Outlook
Clearly this special issue illustrates that amalgamating evidence in the sciences
touches on a variety of philosophical issues concerning confirmation, causation,
induction, modeling, experiment, policy, and theory development. Beyond ad-
vancing the philosophical discussion of these topics, they also bear upon and
deserve further integration with applications in the work of scientists them-
selves. Already the medical sciences have been a focus here (Wu¨thrich and
Steele, 2018; Mayo-Wilson, 2018), with several examples from cancer research
(Wilde and Parkkinen, 2018; Reiss, 2018; Bertolaso and Sterpetti, 2018), phar-
maceutical drug trials (Holman, 2018), brain imaging (Danks and Plis, 2018),
and biopsychosocial models of pain (Baetu, 2018). However, any science that
invites the use of diverse evidence, whether it be sociology (Heesen et al,
2018; Mayo-Wilson, 2018), climate science (Frank, 2018), or even physics (Kao,
2018), can be a target as well, and one should be cautious about extrapolat-
ing conclusions valid in one domain to another. Thus, the role of evidence
amalgamation in these sciences deserves more attention.
Another application we believe deserves further collaborative attention be-
tween scientists, philosophers, and computer scientists is the application of
these ideas to big data sets for which considered decisions cannot so easily
be made on a case-by-case basis. For example, what is the proper place for
(and weight of) expert knowledge in automated assessment of the amalga-
mated evidence? It seems inevitably necessary in order to formulate the right
questions to probe with big data and to keep the answers to those questions
computationally tractable, so not all of the process can or should be entirely
automated.
Scientists must of course be party to these development, but philosophers
are perhaps especially positioned to contribute in a different way, by ab-
stracting general considerations about topics from specific cases—e.g., con-
cerning the confirmatory role that varieties of evidence may and may not play
(Claveau and Grenier, 2018), and the justification of procedures for meta-
analysis (Vieland and Chang, 2018)—then applying those lessons to new cases
in different disciplines. Indeed, what has emerged as a common theme in many
contributions to this special issue is how one can and should transfer knowledge
from one domain or problem to another: extrapolation from one population to
another, the external validity of an experiment, the robustness of a measure-
ment technique, extending static to dynamic causal structure, etc. We enjoin
the reader to explore these further.
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